This paper investigates the factors determining the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). The study also examines the changes in institutional and individual investors' order aggressiveness following the removal of broker IDs on the 28 th of November 2005. While investigating the order submission strategies of stocks sampled from large, medium and small capitalization groups, we document that the institutional and individual investors' order aggressiveness responds similarly to the market depth and the bid-ask spread, but differently to the time left-to-trade (end of the day) and the order size. This difference in the order submission strategies employed by institutional and retail investors is more strongly pronounced in the post-transparent (anonymous) market. In addition, both groups of investors become less aggressive after the move to anonymity, with stronger results observed for individual investors.
Introduction
This study investigates the factors determining the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). In addition, the study also examines the effect of the removal of broker IDs on the ASX on institutional and individual investors' order aggressiveness. In so doing, we address three research questions. to the price and market depth of the best quote. The investigation of investors' order aggressiveness is important for various reasons. First, according to Harris (1998) , understanding the factors that affect order submission strategies will enable traders to decide what type of orders to submit, how to determine the order prices and how and when to revise or cancel their orders, if necessary. Therefore, evidence regarding the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors will facilitate traders to optimize their trading strategies, which, in turn, will result in lower transaction costs and higher portfolio returns.
Second, unlike the quote-driven market where market makers are obliged to provide liquidity, in an order driven market such as the ASX, liquidity provision relies solely on the submission of orders (Bloomfield et al., 2005) . The submission of limit orders is viewed as the provision (supply) of liquidity while market orders consume (demand) liquidity. Therefore, for the market as a whole, analyzing traders' order submission strategies will help to understand better the market conditions under which traders are willing to supply (submission of limit orders) and demand (placement of market orders) liquidity. This will improve our understanding of the price formation process (Ellul et al., 2007) and the fundamental issues of how orderdriven markets function (Bloomfield et al., 2005) .
Furthermore, examining the changing behaviour of institutional and individual investors in different market transparency regimes will provide better understanding of investors' demand and supply of liquidity in response to a reduction in market transparency. These findings will be helpful to market regulators in designing the market mechanism that will enhance the overall market liquidity. The increasingly important role of limit order market as the form of security market organization 2 provides further motivation for the research on the order submission strategies of institutional and individual traders in the limit order market.
The current investigation is also relevant for specialist and dealer markets such as NYSE and NASDAQ since the limit order book is an important part of these markets' trading. For the NYSE, limit order traders play an important role in the market-making process with 74.9% of the quotes have at least one side originated -3 -from limit-order traders (Chung et al., 1999) . The limit order book (the SuperDot system) also accounts for 53 percent of the participations in all transactions in the NYSE (Harris and Hasbrouck, 1996) and as much as 45% of the volume on NASDAQ are traded on the electronic communication networks (ECNs), which are organized as electronic order book markets (Bloomfield et al., 2005) .
The study contributes to the current literature in the following dimensions. To the best of our knowledge, Aitken et al. (2007) is the only study that distinguishes between institutional and individual investors' orders while analysing order aggressiveness. However, the main focus of their study is to highlight which class of investors is more aggressive in their order submission. We contribute to the current literature by investigating the determinants of order aggressiveness for institutional investors and individual investors. We also differentiate from Aitken et al. (2007) by not only analyzing the factors affecting investors' order aggressiveness but also highlighting whether these factors affect institutional and individual investors' order aggressiveness in a similar fashion. The results of our study will enhance the understanding of the similarities as well as the differences in the supply and demand of liquidity of institutional and individual investors in order driven
markets.
Second, we analyze the effect of the change in the degree of market transparency on institutional and individual investors' order aggressiveness. In contrast to the common belief that increasing market transparency will improve market quality, as specified in Madhavan (1992) , Pagano and Roell (1996) and Glosten (1999) , and the current trend of moving towards a more transparent market 5 , from 28 November 2005, the ASX decided to reduce the market transparency by removing the identification (IDs) of brokers submitting orders in the market.
Foucault, Moinas and Theissen (2007) provide a theoretical model suggesting that the move to anonymity will increase (decrease) uninformed investors' aggressiveness if the participation rate of the informed traders in the trading process is low (high).
Empirical evidence regarding the effect of the removal of broker IDs is relatively sparse, and often focuses almost exclusively on the effect on the bid-ask spread.
6 Comerton-Forde and Tang (2007) is the only study that analyzes the effect of removing broker IDs on investors' order aggressiveness. The study documents a reduction in investors' order aggressiveness following the move to anonymity. Our study differs from that of Comerton-Forde and Tang (2007) by differentiating between institutional and individual orders when investigating the impact of reducing market transparency on investors' order aggressiveness. Specifically, we examine whether institutional and individual investors become more or less aggressive following the move to anonymity and whether these two groups of investors react in a similar or different fashion to this change in the market transparency. Moreover, we also incorporate the effect of market depth beyond the best quotes, rather than considering only the market depth at the best quote as in Comerton-Forde and Tang (2007) , in our investigation of order aggressiveness.
In addition, our study also differentiates from prior studies on anonymity by investigating the effect of the move to anonymity on investors' order aggressiveness based on a natural experiment, where we examine the same market in two different periods where the only difference is the anonymity of liquidity suppliers. This differentiates us from prior studies on anonymity, which rely on the comparison between different markets (Garfinkel and Nimalendran, 2003 and Heidle and Huang, 2002) or different trading venues within the same markets (Grammig et al., 2001; Theissen, 2002; Simaan et al., 2003 and Reiss and Werner, 2004 (2006 ( ), Foucault et al. (2007 and Comerton-Forde and Tang (2007) . Overall, our evidence supports the decision by the ASX to remove broker IDs in order to enhance the overall market liquidity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the current literature and develops the hypotheses to be examined in the current study.
Section 3 describes the data to be used in the study and Section 4 explains the research methods. Section 5 discusses the results and implications while Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature Review and Hypotheses

The determinants of order aggressiveness
When making trading decisions, traders can choose to submit limit orders and supply liquidity to the market, or post market orders and consume liquidity. The choice of limit or market orders reflects the trade-off between the costs and benefits of one particular type of order over the other. The advantage of using market orders is the immediacy of the order execution, but it comes with the cost of potentially paying higher execution prices. In contrast, limit orders provide price improvement over market orders, but are associated with the risk of non-execution. Moreover, since the limit price is fixed overtime and monitoring might be costly, limit orders can become mispriced, and thus be executed at unfavourable price. This is often referred in the literature as the risk of being "picked-off". The trade-off among execution probability, price improvement and the risk of being "picked-off" plays a key role in deciding the traders' order choice.
7
Parlour (1998) develops a dynamic model of a limit order book market without asymmetric information to explain the traders' choice of limit and market orders. According to Parlour (1998) , the reduction of the market depth on the sell (buy) side will enhance the execution probability of a limit order at the ask (bid), which in turn will increase the pay-off to limit orders. Therefore, an incoming seller (buyer) is more likely to submit a sell (buy) limit order instead of a sell (buy) market order. In contrast, an increase in the market depth on the sell (buy) side reduces the execution probability of the incoming sell (buy) limit order. Furthermore, buyers also rationally anticipate the crowding out of limit orders on the sell side and so limit buy orders become more attractive than market buy orders. Thus, when the market depth on the sell side increases, an incoming seller (buyer) is more likely to submit a market sell order (limit buy order). Consistent with Parlour (1998), Handa et al. (2003) also show that the larger the excess market depth of the buy (sell) side relative to the market depth of the sell (buy) side, the higher the execution risk to buyers (sellers).
Therefore, the larger (smaller) the imbalance between the buy side relative to the sell side, the more likely buyers (sellers) are to use market orders rather than limit orders.
Foucault (1999) develops a game theoretic model of price formation and order placement decisions in a dynamic limit order market where investors differ in their valuations but not in their private information. Foucault (1999) suggests that higher volatility implies greater risk of being "picked-off" for limit order submitters.
Thus, limit order traders will demand a larger compensation for the risk of being "picked-off" in a more volatile market. This in turn results in a larger spread and a higher cost of trading with market orders. Hence, more traders find it optimal to carry out their trades with limit orders rather than market orders. Drawing on this intuition, the model predicts that the proportion of limit orders in the order flow is positively related to the price volatility and the bid-ask spread in limit order markets. The prediction of a positive relation between limit order submissions and the bid-ask spread is also consistent with the theoretical model of Cohen et al. (1981) , in which limit orders become more attractive as the bid-ask spread increases.
Empirical analysis of investors' order submission strategies generally provides support for theoretical predictions of the effect of spread and market depth on the order aggressiveness of investors. This support is consistent and robust for different markets and over different sample periods (see for example Biais et al., 1995; Griffiths et al., 2000; Ranaldo, 2004; Verhoeven et al., 2004; Cao et al., 2004; Beber and Caglio, 2005; Hall and Hautsch, 2006; Ellul et al., 2007 and Aitken et al., 2007) .
The effect of volatility on order aggressiveness is less conclusive. Bae et al. However, in contrast to Harris (1998) , they document that towards the end of the trading day, rather than becoming more aggressive, informed traders, on average, 
Order aggressiveness and the removal of broker IDs
The literature on the informativeness of broker identification is relatively sparse and often focuses on the effect of withdrawing (or disclosing) broker IDs on bid-ask spread. Simaan et al. (2003) propose the collusion hypothesis which argues that a nonanonymous trading system facilitates collusion among liquidity suppliers. Therefore, traders' aggressiveness is lower under the non-anonymous trading system compared to the anonymous system. In support of this hypothesis, Simaan et al. (2003) document evidence that dealers post more aggressive quotes in an anonymous market (the ECNs) than in a transparent market where dealers' IDs are displayed (the NASDAQ). Since the ASX is a limit order market, we will formulate our hypothesis regarding the effect of the removal broker IDs in the ASX on investors' order aggressiveness based on 
Data
We investigate the determinants of order aggressiveness for the 30 large cap, 30 mid The second dataset is the Market depth data, also provided by SIRCA, which contains information on the market depth of a particular stock. Specifically, it details the 10 best limit prices on the bid and ask side, in association with the total volume (number of shares) and the total number of orders at each price level. This dataset is updated whenever there is a change to the price and/or volume to any of these 10 best limit prices. We remove all the observations in the Market depth dataset whenever the bid price is greater than the ask price at any of the 10 limit price levels. We also exclude all observations where the bid (ask) prices are not in strict descending (ascending) order from the first to the tenth best prices.
For our purpose of investigating the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors, we match the Order book dataset to the Market depth dataset.
Thus, we arrive at a final dataset that contains detailed information on every institutional or individual order submitted, revised or cancelled together with the market depth information at the time of order submission, revision or cancellation.
Research Methodology
Consistent with Biais et al. (1995) , we classify orders into six levels of order aggressiveness. Category 1, the most aggressive orders, are buy (sell) orders with the prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quotes and the size of the orders exceeds the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. These orders will be executed against the volume at the ask (bid) and in part against the market depth available higher (lower) in the book up to the order price. The unfilled portion of the order will enter as limit orders in the order book. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best ask (bid) quotes and demand more volume than the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. These orders will be executed immediately and the unfilled portion will become limit orders at that price in the limit order book. Category 3 orders are orders with price equal to the opposite best quote and demand less volume than the market depth at the best opposite quote. These orders will be executed immediately and in full. Category 4 and 5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing quotes, respectively. Category 6 orders are the least aggressive, in the sense that they are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes. Based on this classification, Category 1, 2 and 3 can be classified as market orders, since they result in immediate execution, while Category 4, 5 and 6 orders are limit orders, as these orders are not executed immediately. These orders stand in the limit orders book, waiting for execution.
The determinants of institutional and individual investors' order aggressiveness will be investigated based on the ordered probit model. The ordered probit model consists of two parts. The first part relates the observable action types ( i R ) to the latent linking variable ( i Z ) as follows: Direction i is included to control for the potential asymmetry between buy and sell orders, as documented in Keim and Madhavan (1995) and Ranaldo (2004) . Size i is also incorporated in the order probit regression to examine the relation between order size and its aggressiveness. Finally, Anonymous i is incorporated into the ordered probit model to investigate the effect of the removal of broker IDs on investors' order aggressiveness. If investors are more (less) aggressive following the move to anonymity, we should expect β 8 to be negative (positive) and significant. In order to highlight the potentially different impact an explanatory variable might have on the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors, the ordered probit model as given with equation (1) is estimated separately for institutional orders and individual orders.
We also perform the analysis of the institutional and individual investors' order aggressiveness for the buy orders and sell orders separately to highlight the potential differences in the determinants of the order aggressiveness of buyers and sellers as documented in Ranaldo (2004) . We estimate the following ordered probit model for institutional and individual investors' buy and sell orders: 
In addition to incorporating the dummy variable for orders submitted in anonymous market as in equation (1) and (2), we also examine the effect of the move to anonymity on investors' order aggressiveness by analyzing the determinants of institutional and individual investors' order aggressiveness separately for the transparent market and for the anonymous market. The model is specified as follows: 
Besides relying on the coefficient estimates of the ordered probit regressions, we also examine the marginal effects induced by an incremental variation in the regressors. Specifically, if the latent order aggressiveness
, the marginal effects of changes in the regressors are calculated as follows:
where φ (.) is the density normal distribution, β (s) are the coefficient estimates from
μ are the intercept parameters (limit points) estimated in equation (3). In the current study, we utilize the individual observations of the regressors rather than the regressors' mean value for estimating the marginal effects.
In other words, based on equation (4), (5) and (6), we calculate the value of β ' x based on each individual value of the explanatory variables rather than the mean value of the regressors. The reported marginal probabilities for will be the average of all the estimated marginal probabilities calculated based on the individual observations of the explanatory variables. et al. (2003) , both institutional and individual investors tend to submit aggressive (market) orders when the same-side market depth is higher than the opposite-side market depth. For both institutional and individual investors, the relative bid-ask spread is also higher at the time of limit order submission than at the time of market order submission. These observations present early support for the effect of spread and market depth on order aggressiveness, as specified in Hypothesis 1 and 2.
Results and Discussion
Statistics of order submissions
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] Table 2 provides information regarding the distribution of order aggressiveness levels over the course of the trading day. In the current study, we partition the trading day into six intervals: 10:10 am-11:00 am, 11:00 am-12:00 pm, 12:00 pm-1:00 pm, 1:00 pm-2:00pm, 2:00 pm-3:00pm and 3:00pm-4:00 pm.
The distribution of order aggressiveness levels
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] From Table 2 , we observe that the order aggressiveness of institutional investors has a U-shaped pattern. Institutional investors are more aggressive and demand more liquidity (place more market orders) early on in the trading day than in other intervals. As the trading day progresses, institutional investors become less aggressive and submit fewer market orders and more limit orders. Towards the end of the trading day, institutional investors increase their order aggressiveness. However, the order aggressiveness of institutional investors at the end of the trading day is not as high as it is at the beginning of the trading day. Individual investors behave in an opposite fashion; they are less aggressive early on in the day and become more aggressive as the trading deadline approaches. This is reflected by the increase (decrease) in the use of market (limit) orders towards the end of the trading day.
We also investigate the effect of the removal of broker IDs on the distribution of investors' order aggressiveness. The results presented in Table 3 suggest that institutional and individual investors appear to be less aggressive and reduce their use of market orders following the move to anonymity. In contrast, both groups of investors tend to increase their use of limit orders in the anonymous market, with the largest increases observed for Category 5 orders for institutional investors and Table 4 presents the results of investigating the determinants of order aggressiveness for institutional and individual investors, based on the ordered probit model specified in equation (1). Since the aggressiveness levels are ranked from 1 (the most aggressive) to 6 (the least aggressive), a negative coefficient indicates a positive relation between the explanatory variable and investors' order aggressiveness.
The order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] From Table 4 , we observe positive (negative) and significant relation between the same-side (opposite-side) market depth and order aggressiveness for all stocks under investigation. These results are consistent for both institutional and individual investors' orders and provide support for Hypothesis 1. Consistent with prior literature, 13 these findings suggest that the market depth can be viewed as a proxy for the execution probability and thus will affect investors' order aggressiveness. Both institutional and individual investors tend to submit more aggressive orders when the same-side market depth increases or when the opposite-side market depth decreases.
In contrast, investors tend to submit less aggressive orders when the same-side market depth decreases or when the opposite-side increases.
We also find the majority of the coefficients for the bid-ask spread to be positive and significant for institutional investors' orders. This finding supports Hypothesis 2, which suggests a negative relation between the order aggressiveness of institutional investors and the bid-ask spread. The order aggressiveness of individual investors is also negatively related to the bid-ask spread but only in the large cap and mid cap stocks. In small cap stocks, individual investors tend to submit more aggressive orders when the spread widens.
The finding for the effect of volatility on investors' order aggressiveness is less conclusive. For large cap stocks, we observe a positive relation between the order aggressiveness of institutional investors and volatility. In contrast, a negative relation between institutional investors' order aggressiveness and volatility is documented in mid cap stocks while this relation is insignificant for the majority of small cap stocks.
For individual investors, their order aggressiveness is negatively related to volatility in mid cap stocks but positively related to volatility in small cap stocks. In contrast,
there is no clear-cut evidence regarding the direction or the significance of the relation between volatility and individual investors' order aggressiveness for large cap stocks.
Our finding regarding the effect of volatility on order aggressiveness is similar to the mixed empirical evidence in prior literature. Higher volatility is associated with the higher risk of being "picked-off" by better-informed investors. Therefore, if institutional investors are better-informed and monitor the order book more closely, they will try to "pick-off" mispriced limit orders more in the high volatile period.
Since the limit order book is thicker for large cap stocks than for mid and small cap stocks, the execution costs are relatively lower for institutional investors to adopt this trading strategy in large cap stocks than in mid and small cap stocks. Thus, we observe a positive relation between volatility and order aggressiveness for institutional investors in large cap stocks but not in mid cap and small cap stocks.
On the other hand, because the prices of small cap stocks are also relatively smaller compared to large cap and mid cap stocks, a similar change in price will result in a larger absolute return in small cap stocks compared to large cap and mid cap stocks. Therefore, investors in small cap stocks are potentially more risk-averse than in large and mid cap stocks. Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) and Wald and Horrigan Overall, the results in Table 2 and the results regarding the FirstInt variable presented in Table 4 information is incorporated into prices, institutional investors switch to using limit orders and provide liquidity to the market. Individual investors behave in the opposite direction; they are less aggressive early on in the trading day and more aggressive as trading expiration approaches to achieve their trading targets.
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With regard to the relation between order size and order aggressiveness, the results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that in large and mid cap stocks, the larger the institutional investors' orders, the more aggressive they are. In contrast, in small cap stocks, institutional investors are often less aggressive when they submit a large order.
For individual investors, if they submit a large order, this order is often nonaggressive as well. This contrasting behaviour of institutional and individual investors suggests that for institutional investors, the non-execution risk is more important than the "picked-off" risk when submitting large orders. In contrast, the "picked-off" risk appears to be more important for individual investors when placing large orders. (2005) . 15 We also incorporate the remaining time (in hours) until market closing time (TTC) into the ordered probit regression. Negative (positive) and significant coefficient estimates for the TTC variable are observed for institutional (individual) investors in the majority of large cap, mid cap and small cap stocks. This evidence indicates that institutional investors are more aggressive early on in the trading day while individual investors are more aggressive in their order submission towards the end of the trading day. These results are consistent with those presented in Table 4 and are available upon request from the authors. 16 Our result regarding the relation between order size and order aggressiveness of institutional and retail investors might also provide explanation for the finding in Aitken et al. (2007) that order Finally, we document mixed results regarding the relation between order direction and order aggressiveness. The results in Table 4 show that institutional investors' sell orders are more aggressive than their buy orders, especially in mid cap and small cap stocks. In contrast, individual investors' sell orders are more (less)
aggressive than buy orders in small cap and mid cap stocks (large cap stocks). This finding implies that institutional and individual investors consider a higher opportunity cost of non-execution for sell orders in mid and small cap stocks while individual investors are more patient in their selling activities in large cap stocks.
The order aggressiveness of buy and sell orders
We investigate the order aggressiveness of institutional investors' buy and sell orders in Table 5 . We observe consistent results regarding the same-side market depth, the opposite-side market depth, the bid-ask spread, volatility and order size for both buy and sell orders. In addition, the majority of the coefficient estimates for the FirstInt variable in Panel A of Table 5 are negative and significant, which indicates that institutional investors tend to be more aggressive early on in the trading day for buy orders. In contrast, we observe a similar pattern in institutional sell orders only in large cap and mid cap stocks. For small cap stocks, the majority of the coefficient estimates for the FirstInt variable in Panel B of Table 5 are insignificant. This finding suggests that in small cap stocks, there is no tendency for institutional investors to be more aggressive in their selling activities early on in the day. This difference in results for buy and sell orders suggests that if the behaviour of institutional investors aggressive is positively related to order size for heavily traded stocks and negatively related to order size for lightly traded stocks. The overall positive relation between order size and order aggressiveness in heavily traded stocks is driven by the positive relation between order size and the order aggressiveness of institutional investors. In contrast, we will observe a negative relation between order size and order aggressiveness in lightly traded stocks since both institutional and individual investors' order aggressiveness are negatively related to the order size for small caps stocks.
throughout the day can be explained by their information advantage over individual investors, institutional investors tend to exploit their information advantage using buy orders. This is also consistent with the finding of Griffiths et al. (2000) that aggressive buy orders are more likely to be motivated by information than sell orders.
[
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
The results of investigating the order aggressiveness of individual investors' buy and sell orders are given in Table 6 . For individual investors, the buy and sell order aggressiveness is positively related to the same-side market depth and negatively related to the opposite-side market depth and the order size. In addition, the majority of the coefficient estimates for the FirstInt variable are positive and significant. This finding suggests that individual investors are less aggressive in both their buying and selling activities early on in the trading day. The most significant difference in the effect of spread and volatility on individual buy and sell orders are observed in mid cap stocks. In mid cap stocks, when the spread increases, individual investors tend to submit less aggressive buy orders but more aggressive sell orders.
Similarly, a rise in volatility will result in the submission of less aggressive buy orders but more aggressive sell orders.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
Anonymity and investors' order aggressiveness
We investigate the effect of the removal of broker IDs on investors' order aggressiveness by comparing the proportion of market and limit orders submitted by institutional and individual investors before and after the move to anonymity Results of this investigation appear in Table 3 . In addition, we also incorporate a dummy variable indicating orders submitted in the anonymous trading system (orders submitted from 28 November 2005 onwards) to the ordered probit model in equations
(1) and (2).
In addition to the results in Table 3, from Tables 4, 5 and 6, we also obtain a positive and significant coefficient estimate for the Anonymous variable for the majority of the stocks analyzed in this study. This evidence is consistent for all three groups of stocks, for both buy and sell orders and for both institutional and individual investors, with stronger results obtained for individual investors. This finding is also consistent with the observation of the reduction in the use of market orders for both institutional and individual investors in Table 3 . Overall, the results in Tables 3, 4 For individual investors, the most significant differences when examining the two market regimes are observed for the effect of order size and the first trading hour on order aggressiveness. In the transparent market, individual investors are more aggressive when submitting large orders while they tend to be less aggressive when placing large orders in the anonymous market. This pattern in order submission is consistent with that of the institutional investors in large cap and mid cap stocks. In addition, individual investors are also less aggressive in the first trading hour, especially in the small cap stocks and in the anonymous market. Overall, these findings suggest that in an anonymous market where uninformed investors cannot identify the order submission of informed investors, they tend to submit less aggressive orders when the information asymmetry is potentially higher (in the first hour of the trading day) and when risk of being "picked-off" is higher (when their order size is larger).
In addition to the coefficient estimates, we also analyze the marginal effects induced by an incremental variation in one of the explanatory variables based on equations (4), (5) and (6). The results of this investigation are given in Tables 9, 10 and 11.
[INSERT TABLES 9, 10, AND 11 HERE]
The marginal effects analysis in Tables 9, 10 and 11 shows that a change in the same-side (opposite-side) market depth is associated with a positive (negative) marginal reaction for market order traders and a negative (positive) marginal reaction for limit order traders. A change in the bid-ask spread is also associated with a negative reaction for market order traders and a positive reaction for limit order traders. The switching normally occurs between traders who place limit orders within the quotes (Category 4 orders) and the traders who submit orders at the quote (Category 5 orders). Consistent with the results in Table 7 and 8, we observe inconclusive evidence regarding the marginal effects for the Volatility and Direction variable. Institutional investors generally increase the probability of submitting aggressive orders during the first trading hour while individual investors tend to decrease the probability of submitting aggressive orders in the same period. Finally, institutional and individual investors also differ in their marginal reaction to a change in the order size in large and mid cap stocks in the anonymous market regime and in small cap stocks in the transparent market regime.
Conclusion
This study investigates the factors affecting the order aggressiveness of institutional Biais et al. (1995) , orders are classified into six aggressiveness levels. Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with the prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quotes and the order size exceeds the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best ask (bid) quotes and demand more volume than the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 3 orders are orders with price equal to the opposite best quote and demand less volume than the market depth at the best opposite quote. Category 4 and 5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing quotes, respectively. Category 6 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes. "Frequency" is the number of orders submitted at a particular aggressiveness level. "% of all orders" is the percentage of the number of orders in a particular order aggressiveness level over all orders. "Order size" is the average number of shares submitted in an order. "Depth at best same (opposite)" is the average number of shares at the best same-side (opposite-site) quote at the time of order submission. "Depth at same (opposite)" is the average number of shares at the 10 best same-side (opposite-side) quote at the time of order submission. "Relative spread" is the average relative spread, which is calculated as the bid ask spread over the bid-ask midpoint, at the time of the order submission. "Volatility" is the average volatility, which is calculated as the standard deviation of the most recent 20 mid-quote returns at the time of order submission multiplied by 100. (1995) , order are classified into six aggressiveness levels. Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with the prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quotes and the order size exceeds the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best ask (bid) quotes and demand more volume than the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 3 orders are orders with price equal to the opposite best quote and demand less volume than the market depth at the best opposite quote. Category 4 and 5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing quotes, respectively. Category 6 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes. Orders with aggressiveness levels from 1 to 3 are market orders and orders with aggressiveness levels from 4 to 6 are limit orders. The trading day is divided into six intervals: 10:10 am-11:00 am, 11:00 am-12:00 pm, 12:00 pm-1:00 pm, 1:00 pm-2:00pm, 2:00 pm-3:00pm and 3:00pm-4:00 pm. "MO" ("LO") refers to the total number of market (limit) orders in a particular interval. "Total" is the total number of orders submitted in a particular interval. "% MO" ("% LO") is the percentage of market (limit) orders out of all orders submitted in a particular interval. (1995) , order are classified into six aggressiveness levels. Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with the prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quotes and the order size exceeds the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best ask (bid) quotes and demand more volume than the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 3 orders are orders with price equal to the opposite best quote and demand less volume than the market depth at the best opposite quote. Category 4 and 5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing quotes, respectively. Category 6 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes. "% Inst. orders" and "% Indi. orders" refers to the percentage out of all institutional and individual orders, respectively. -43 - 
Panel A: Institutional orders
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